Abstract-Recently, with the support of mobile cloud computing, large number of health-related data collected from various body sensor networks can be managed efficiently. However, it is an important and challenging issue to keep data security and data privacy in cloud-integrated body sensor network (C-BSN). In this paper, we present a novel secure access control mechanism MC-ABE (Mask Certificate-Attribute Based Encryption) for cloud-integrated body sensor networks. A specific signature is designed to mask the plaintext, then the masked data can be securely outsourced to cloud severs. An authorization certificate composing of the signature and related privilege items is constructed that is used to grant privileges to data receivers. To ensure security, a unique value is chosen to mask the certificate for each data receiver. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme has less computation cost and storage cost compared with other popular models.
INTRODUCTION
Body sensor networks (BSN) have emerged recently with the rapid development of wearable sensors, implantable sensors and short range wireless communication, which make pervasive healthcare monitoring and management become increasingly popular [1, 2] . By the body sensor network, healthrelated data of the patient can be collected and transferred to the healthcare staff in real time.
With the support of mobile cloud computing, cloudintegrated body sensor network (C-BSN) can be constructed [3] . In C-BSN, massive local body sensor networks are integrated together and mass data are collected and stored in cloud servers; healthcare issues will continually monitor their patients' status and exchange views when it is difficult to make diagnosis.
However, there are still several problems and challenges in C-BSN [3, 4] . For example, data security and data privacy must be a concern since patient-related data is private and sensitive. In this paper, we propose a secure data access control scheme named MC-ABE.
In this paper, we propose a novel secure access control mechanism MC-ABE to tackle with the aforementioned problems. And, main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
We construct one specific signature to mask the plaintext, then realize securely encryption/decryption outsourcing. We construct an authentication certificate for each visitor and mask it with a unique value, which makes the system achieve more effective control on malicious visitors and low cost for user revocation. MC-ABE takes less time than other compared methods in data collecting, transmission and acquisition.
There are also some limitations in this work, we provide a low cost data encryption outsource model, the access tree is encrypted by severs, the access policy is exposed to cloud. The encryption operation is based on bilinear pairing, and cloud severs will have more bilinear pairing computation burden.
II. RELATED WORK Recently, various techniques have been proposed to address the problems of data security and data privacy in C-BSN. In [5] , Sahai and Waters proposed the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) to realize access control on encrypted data. In ABE, the ciphertext's encryption policy is associated with a set of attributes, and the data owner can be offline after data is encrypted. One year later, Goyal proposed a new type of ABE Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [6] . In KP-ABE, the ciphertext's encryption policy is also associated with a set of attributes, but the attributes are organized into a tree structure (named access tree). The benefit of this approach is that a more flexible access control strategy can be attained and a fine-grained access control can be realized. Benthcourt proposed CP-ABE (ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption) [7] , in which the data owner constructed the access tree together with the visitors' identity information. The user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if attributes in his private key match the access tree. Yu et al. [8] proposed the scheme based on KP-ABE, and combines with the two ore-encryption. It was proved that the proposed scheme can meet the security requirement in cloud quite well. Similarly, Wang et al. proposed an access control scheme based on CP-ABE, which is also secure and efficient in the cloud environment [9] .
In [10] , to reduce computation overhead and achieve secure encryption/decryption outsourcing, a portion of computation overhead was transferred from the data owner to the cloud sever. A similar method is also adopted in the work of Zhou [11] , which proposed an efficient data management model to balance communication and storage overhead to reduce the cost of data management operations. In [12] , Yao el al. proposed a novel access control mechanism in which data operation privileges are granted based on authorization certificates. The advantage of such mechanisms is that the computation cost can be decreased remarkably, since there is no bilinear map calculation. The disadvantage is that many of operations need to be handled by the data owner. In [13] , authors considered the problem of patient self-controlled access privilege to highly sensitive Personal Health Information. They proposed a Secure Patient-centric Access Control scheme which allows data requesters to have different access privileges based on their roles, and then assigns different attribute sets to them. However, they took the cloud server as trusted, and their scheme did not work well for user revocation. The DL assumption holds in G if it is computationally infeasible to solve the DL problem in G [14] .
B. Notations
In table I, the notations used in MC-ABE are listed. 
C. Access Structure
The access structure in CP-ABE is the tree-structure, which is named as access tree [2] . For the access tree T, the leaf nodes are associated with descriptive attributes; each interior node is a relation function, such as AND (n of n), OR (1of n), n of m (m>n).
Each DR has a set of attributes, which are associated with DR's SK. If DR's attributes set satisfies the access tree, the encrypted data can be decrypted by DR's SK.
D. Assumption
In this work, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: service providers (ESP, DSP, SSP) are semi-trusted. That is, they will follow our proposed protocol in general, but try to find out as much secret information as possible.
Assumption 2: SetS and TA are trusted. On no conditions will they leak information about data and related keys.
In order to deduce more information about encrypted data, service providers might combine their information to perform collusion attack. In our scheme, collusions between service providers are taken into consideration.
IV. MC-ABE

A. Overview
Our proposed scheme MC-ABE is shown in figure 2 . Seven algorithms are included in MC-ABE: Setup, Encrypt DO , Encrypt ESP , KeyGen, CerGen, Decrypt DSP , Decrypt DR .
For data outsourcing, DO encrypts M with algorithm Encrypt DO , in which signature is used to mask M. Then ESP encrypts T with the algorithm Encrypt ESP to finish the encryption. The encrypted data is stored in SSP.
For data access, when DR requests data from SSP, the request is sent to TA after verification. TA chooses a unique value to the mask certificate for DR. Then, TA computes SK with the algorithm KeyGen. After that, SK is sent to DSP and the certificate is sent to DR. At the same time, SSP sends the CT to DSP. With SK and CT, DSP can do decryption and get M that is masked by signature. Once DR receives the certificate, he decrypts the masked certificate with his unique value (TA sends the unique value to this DR when the first authorized request occurred. It will be used in the following requests until this DR is revoked) to get the certificate. Using the certificate, DR can decrypt the masked M with signatures in the certificate. In addition, if a DR is revoked, TA will mark the DR as 'revoked' and this DR's unique mask value will be invalid. No certificate will be granted to this DR any more. File ID: ID list of the authorized files, "f1"is the ID of file1.
B. Two Important
Valid Period: it denotes the valid period of the signature, from the start time to the end time.
Signature: it's used by DO to mask the plaintext in data encryption; it's used by DR to get the plaintext in data decryption. "signf1" denotes the signature of file1.
Privilege: the privilege denoted by the signature such as read, modify, delete. "pf1" denotes the privilege of signf1. If DR is a new user, MValue and MCert will be sent to him. Otherwise, send MCert to the DR.
C. Scheme Description
The whole process of MC-ABE is shown in figure 2 . In this section, we describe each step in detail. Lastly, Algorithm 3. Encrypt ESP (PK, s, T, MM) [7, 11] → CT:
Implemented by ESP, the access tree T is encrypted from the root node R to leaf nodes. For each node x in T, choose a polynomial q x ., for node x， Y is the set of leaf nodes in T. Compute as follows:
, , 2) Data Request When a DR requests data from SSP, TA generates SK and a certificate for DR. Most of decryption cost is taken by DSP but DSP can't get M. Based on the effort of DSP, DR finishes the last step of decryption and gets M. Similarly, there're also three steps for data outsourcing. 
Then, TA sends SK to DSP.
Secondly, DSP performs the first step of data decryption: decrypt the access tree in CT to get MM.
Algorithm 5. DecryptDSP(SK, CT)→MM
When x is a leaf node, let i=att(x). Function att(x) denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the tree.
When x is an interior node, call the algorithm DecryptNodeNL(CT,SK,x).
For all of the children z of node x, call DecryptNodeL(CT, SK,z), and the output is F z . Let S x be a k x (the threshold value of interior node) random set and let z F  . If no such set exists, the function cannot be satisfied, so return  .
Otherwise, compute as follows and return the result: 
( , )
Receiving M signature  and MCert, DR implements the algorithm Decrypt DR to finish data decryption.
Lastly, DR removes the masked value in MM to get M. 
3) User revocation
An invalid DR is a DR who is thought to be malicious, or whose certificate is expired. The invalid DR should be revoked from the authorized access list. In MC-ABE, we can remove the MValue record in table 3 to revoke DR. Firstly, TA modifies the revoked DR's 'Revocation' item from 'N' to 'Y' in Mask Value Table. Secondly, current signature must be updated to a new one. After these two steps, the invalid DR is revoked. When he requests new data, he will be taken as new comer (the signature is updated, and he doesn't have the new one), and TA will refuse his request since he is marked as revoked. For valid DR, they'll get the new signature and access the system as usual.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Encryption and decryption outsource
In this paper, M is masked by DO before it is sent to ESP. DO and authorized DR can get M. ESP and DSP can get MM (Masked M), but they can't deduce M from MM. For DSP, it can decrypt CT using SK, and get the masked M= M signature  . The information DSP get is the same as ESP. So, in MC-ABE, data decryption outsourcing is also secure since it's similar to data encryption outsourcing.
B. Certificate.
The security of the signature relies on the certificate. Each DR has his unique masked certificate; DR can retrieve his certificate only by his own MValue. In the following, we prove that malicious DR cannot get MCert without the right MValue. 
C. Revocation
If a DR is revealed to be malicious, he'll be revoked from the authorized user list. We update the signature encrypted in CT, after that, the revoked DR can't get authorized data any more.
Revoked signature held by DR:
Thus, MC-ABE is secure in revocation.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Numerical analysis
Mainly computation cost in the scheme is computations in algorithms, attribute number in a tree or SK is the key factor to influence the computation cost. Simulation results of computation cost in MC-ABE shows in figure 3 . Confidence interval shows in table IV.
In CP-ABE, data encryption is done by DO. In PP-CP-ABE, data encryption/decryption is outsourced to service providers, DO take a part of the access tree encryption computation cost. In figure 7(a) , the computation cost of three different schemes is compared. In table 5, the cost of MC-ABE and CP-ABE is compared. As shown in figure 7(b) , we also compare computation cost of DO and ESP in MC-ABE. In figure 7(c) , the computation cost will grow with the number of attributes in private key, (Confidence interval of key generation computation is shown in table V.). Unlike the algorithm of keygen, computation cost in setup will not be influenced by attribute number. In MC-ABE, most of the computation cost has been shifted to DSP, so the computation cost of DR is constant as shown in figure 7(d). User revocation is simplified for the signature is introduced. The simulation results are as shown in figure 7 (e). (1) O(m) ("n" is the number of leaf nodes in access tree, and m is the attributes number of a DR.) Fig.3(a) . DO's computation cost for data encryption in CP-ABE, PP-CP-ABE and MC-ABE. In PP-CP-ABE, part of encryption computation is transferred to cloud sever to reduce DO's cost in MC-ABE. Fig.3(b) . Computation cost of DO (The 95% confidence interval assuming random data with normal distribution is shown). Fig.3(c) . Computation cost of key generation and setup (The 95% confidence interval assuming random data with normal distribution is shown). Fig.3(d) . Computation cost of DR in CP-ABE and MC-ABE. Similar to ESP in MC-ABE, DSP also undertake most of the computation in decryption. The cost is proportional to attributes number in private key. Fig.3(e) . Computation cost for user revocation. With the authorization certificate in MC-ABE, revocation cost can be reduced obviously.
